1. **Name of Property**
   Historic name: E Street Complex (Office of Strategic Services and Central Intelligence Agency Headquarters)
   Other names/site number: Hygienic Laboratory of the United States Public Health Service / National Institute of Health Headquarters
   Name of related multiple property listing: N/A
   (Enter "N/A" if property is not part of a multiple property listing)

2. **Location**
   Street & number: 2430 E Street NW (24th and E Streets NW)
   City or town: Washington
   State: DC
   County: ____________
   Not For Publication: [ ]
   Vicinity: [ ]

3. **State/Federal Agency Certification**
   As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended,
   I hereby certify that this nomination request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60.
   In my opinion, the property ___ meets ___ does not meet the National Register Criteria. I recommend that this property be considered significant at the following level(s) of significance:
   ___ national ___ statewide ___ local
   Applicable National Register Criteria:
   ___A ___B ___C ___D

   ________________________________
   Signature of certifying official/Title: ____________________________

   ________________________________
   State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government

   ________________________________
   Signature of commenting official: ____________________________

   ________________________________
   Title: ____________________________ State or Federal agency/bureau or Tribal Government
4. National Park Service Certification

I hereby certify that this property is:

___ entered in the National Register
___ determined eligible for the National Register
___ determined not eligible for the National Register
___ removed from the National Register
___ other (explain): ____________________________

__________________________
Signature of the Keeper

__________________________
Date of Action

5. Classification

Ownership of Property

(Check as many boxes as apply.)
Private: □
Public – Local □
Public – State □
Public – Federal □

Category of Property

(Check only one box.)
Building(s) □
District □
Site □
Structure □
Object □
E Street Complex (OSS and CIA HQ)  Washington, DC

Name of Property

Number of Resources within Property
(Do not include previously listed resources in the count)

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Number of contributing resources previously listed in the National Register: 0

6. Function or Use

Historic Functions
(Enter categories from instructions.)

Government/ Government Office
Landscape/Plaza

Current Functions
(Enter categories from instructions.)

Government/ Government Office
Landscape/Plaza

7. Description

Architectural Classification

Late 19th And 20th Century Revivals/ Classical Revival

Materials: (enter categories from instructions.)
Principal exterior materials of the property: Brick, Limestone, Concrete

Narrative Description

Summary Paragraph

The E Street Campus, whose address is often given as 2430 E Street NW, is located west of Twenty-Third Street NW and immediately south of E Street NW on the northwest slope of Navy Hill in Washington, DC. It now consists of the Central, East, and South Buildings and a central quadrangle. Its significant interior spaces include the office of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director’s Conference Room on the first floor of the East Building. The maps depicted in Illustrations A1 through A9 trace the evolution of the Campus through the
period of significance. Illustrations B1 through B31 document the current condition of the Campus buildings and quadrangles. (See Attachment 1 for a full list of illustrations.)

The buildings and quadrangle of the E Street complex are substantially unaltered from photographs which date back to their period of significance and convey these clear associations with the historic events which took place within them. The campus thus possesses integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association.

**Narrative Description**

The E Street Campus today consists of the Central, East, and South Buildings and a central quadrangle. Its significant interior spaces include the office of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director’s Conference Room on the first floor of the East Building. The maps depicted in Illustrations A1 through A9 trace the evolution of the Campus through the period of significance. Illustrations B1 through B31 document the current condition of the Campus buildings and quadrangles. (See Attachment 1 for a full list of illustrations.)

Although there is no evidence that it was originally intended as such, the E Street campus evolved into a traditional Beaux Arts quadrangle plan, with buildings facing a landscaped center court which is open on one side. The campus’ original building, the Hygienic Laboratory (later the North Building), originally faced an undeveloped stretch of E Street NW and was entered from a roadway from the corner of Twenty-Third Street NW that passed through the grounds of what became the Naval Medical School. The original utilitarian frame supporting structures were scattered down the hillside to its south.

Perhaps the first expression of the site as a planned campus was the construction in the nineteen twenties of more permanent masonry support buildings near its southeast corner, where a back entrance gave egress to the more industrial area around Twenty-fifth and Water Streets. The construction of the Central building in 1922 first expressed a courtyard motif by creating an interstitial space framed by the parallel axes of the two buildings and partially enclosed by their hyphen sections on the north and south. However, it was the construction of the Administration and new South Building circa 1933-34 that defined the central quadrangle with the south façade of the Central Building. Within this ensemble, the Administration Building occupies a position of superiority from its location at the highest point of the complex, and its commanding view of the Potomac River through the open side of the quadrangle. This central quadrangle composition facilitated the campus’ adaption an intelligence headquarters by offering its ultimate command center, the Office of the Director in the Administration Building, a protected position within a frame of the Central Building, the South Building, and the secure campus of the Naval Medical School to the east.

The Central Building (1922) is the earliest existing building on the E Street campus. It was originally known as the South Building because it was erected immediately to the south of the now-demolished Hygienic Laboratory (1902-1909). Because the Central Building resembled the laboratory and stood quite close to it, it was erroneously called an addition to that earlier structure on occasion. Its Georgian Revival in style, of red brick with a freed adaptation of
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classical detailing in contrasting material, was a popular style for World War I era public buildings. The Central Building very much resembles many of its contemporaries at the Walter Reed Medical Center.

Built of red-brown brick, the Central Building has three stories of space below an attic which provides storage space. On the building’s north side, only the upper two stories are above grade. The Central Building consists of a center section whose gable runs north-south and two long wings whose gables run east-west. At the end of each wing, a short, hyphen-like section with a hipped roof stretches north toward the former site of the North Building. At the right angle intersection of the ridgelines of the roofs of the wings and central section is an octagonal wooden dome, each face of which is pierced by a crescent window divided into arcs of four lights above two lights. The dome appears to be roofed in slate, while the remainder of the building is covered by a red metallic roof. A rectangular brick chimney pierces the roof above each wing on its north side. The chimney above the east wing is slightly taller, and flanks a small brick mechanical penthouse and metal ventilation scoop.

Like the other buildings in the campus, the formal entrance to the Central Building faces the inner quadrangle rather than toward the North Building and E Street beyond. Its central section, faced in wood and masonry, is treated as a classical portico, with a triangular pediment above. The lower edge of the pediment is defined by a protruding cornice that continues the cornice that runs below the roofline around the entire building. Below it, a vertical band bears a continuous lower molding which separates it from a lower cornice band which runs atop the portico section only. This lower cornice consists of a vertical band with a recessed lower section which runs atop the portico’s pilasters. These consist of broader, square pilasters at either end of the portico and four round columns with Corinthian columns which separate the tiers of vertically-aligned windows of the first and second floors. The fluted bases of the pilasters and columns rest atop the lower floor level of the center section, which has an entrance door at its center beneath a curved metal awning. This door is reached from the quadrangle by a flight of concrete steps. The remainder of the south façade of the building is red brick, with a flat cement cornice band separating the second and lower stories.

Each story of the Central Building’s south façade is differentiated by its vertically-aligned fenestration. The upper story has one-over-one light rectangular sash windows. The second story has separate arched sections above and rectangular panels below its rectangular lower sashes. In the central portico section, these windows are instead topped with transom-like, rectangular sashes. The rectangular one-over-one sash windows of the lowest story are smaller than those of the upper story.

The building’s north façade is similar to the south, except that its center section lacks the classical portico treatment. It instead has an asymmetrical fenestration pattern which features an arched ensemble of vertically-divided windows on its attic level. A double-width door that presumably allowed large equipment to enter or leave the upper floor is at the center of its second story level, with a large rectangular window on its east side and a smaller one to its west. Similar windows are present on the first floor flanking an entrance door below a curved awning. Similar fenestration patterns are found on the hyphen sections, although the arched first story
windows have wider surrounding trim and the upper fenestration is an ensemble of a center double sash window flanked by two narrower windows.

The quadrangle is an open area between the Central, Administration and South Buildings which is shaped like a rectangle with slightly rounded corners and surrounded by a driveway. Its eastern section is landscaped with shrubs, while its western section is devoted to a lawn with picnic tables. Originally the driveway was separated from the surrounding buildings by small lawns. These largely have been paved over for parking.

The circa 1933-35 Administration and South Buildings contrast with the Central Building in materials and design. Constructed of limestone, the Administration Building, the smallest of the surviving campus buildings, is perhaps the most formal. The most prominent feature of its neoclassical west façade, which dominates the central courtyard, is a central portico with eight massive Ionic columns. The portico differs from that of the Central Building in that it is topped by a three section pediment of rectangular limestone slabs, rather than a classical triangle form. A shelf-like horizontal pediment tops the aluminum double door which provides entrance to the building at the top of a flight of steps from the quadrangle. The Administration Building is two stories tall, with a basement and attic, and is topped by a hipped roof. Its differing fenestration pattern for each floor follows the design scheme of the Central Building. The second story of the Administration Building has rectangular eight-over-eight double sash windows, while the lower story incorporates a rectangular transom-like sash of four horizontally-aligned lights above the double-hung eight-over-eight sash below. On the façade’s north and south bays, the first story windows are inset in arched recesses which suggest the arched sashes above the first floor windows of the Central Building.

The Administration’s east façade, which faces the steep embankment below the Naval Medical campus across a driveway, carries the same fenestration pattern as the west façade. The key difference is that this less-public elevation lacks the portico found on the west façade. Rather than ionic columns, square pilasters with simplified capitals and fluted bases separate its vertically-aligned upper and lower story windows. A strongly-defined cornice curves outward below the roof. The fenestration pattern continues on the shorter north and south facades of the building. Here three tiers of windows on the upper and lower stories are divided from each other and the rest of the façade by four square pilasters. At the south end of the building, the basement story is illuminated by small rectangular windows where it is exposed by the grade of the hill. The first floor of the Administration Building contains the office of OSS Director General William J. Donovan, which was afterwards occupied by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles. In 1961, the Office of the DCI moved to the new CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, but the former director’s office remained in use as needed at least through the tenure of Richard Helms as DCI from 1966 through 1973.

General Donovan’s office is located in the southwest corner of the building’s first floor, whose hallways bear such original detailing as classical pediments above the office doorways. General Donovan’s office overlooks the Kennedy Center and Potomac River through the window which faced his desk. The office, which is today used as a conference room by the Department of State, is also the sight of a commemorative display honoring General Donovan and the OSS, which
includes a plaque mounted on the wall beside the place occupied by his desk. The office, which was never ornate, retains its original configuration, as well as such original features as its paneling and doors. The nearby Director’s Conference Room remains in use, but is a high security area which cannot be photographed.

The South Building contains roughly the square footage of the Central and Administrative Buildings combined, standing three stories tall on its quadrangle side and four stories above the ground on its south side. The second story of the building is thus its ground floor on its north façade. It is constructed of limestone like the neighboring Administration Building.

Like the Central Building, the South Building is constructed as a central block on an east-west axis, with hyphen sections running north-south at either end. The central block has a gabled roof whose ridgeline runs east-west, while the hyphens have hipped roofs running at right angles to the central block’s roof. All four of the hyphen sections’ front facades are identically composed. On each, a recessed central section contains tiers of three windows which illuminate the second and third floors. This recessed section is bounded by square pilasters with stylized capitals, and the windows of each tier are separated by round pilasters topped with Ionic capitals. A heavy curved cornice similar to that of the Administration Building overhangs the third story, with the fourth story slightly set back above it. On each hyphen, the front façade of the fourth story bears a row of three single windows, while the east and west inner sides of each hyphen bears a single window.

Unlike the Central Building, the central block of the South Building does not include a protruding center section, although there are entrance doors at the center of the ground floors of the north and south facades. The South Building’s central block fenestration pattern is similar to that of the Administration Building. Along with the fourth story, the second and third stories have rectangular eight-over-eight double sash windows, which on the second story are topped with rectangular transom-like upper sashes with four horizontal lights. Like the first story windows on the north and south bays of the Administration Building’s façade, the second story windows are inset in recesses with a curved arch above and a recessed tablet below. This fenestration pattern is repeated on the outer side facades of each hyphen.

The first floor of the South Building begins to rise above grade level at roughly the midpoint of the hyphens, and is completely above ground on the south side of the building. The exposed first story is faced with limestone block which, although it is smooth, suggests the rusticated stone block water tables of many classical revival style buildings. Its window apertures contain eight-over-eight double sash windows with arched tops. The South Building and a walkway which parallels its south façade sit atop a retaining wall of rectangular concrete blocks which rises perhaps twenty feet above the complex’s lower parking lot. At its center, a tunnel-like passage gives access to the building’s basement level.

Like the Administration Building, the South Building’s overall style is a simplified classicism which is a hallmark of New Deal-era public buildings. The South Building bears a particular resemblance to the District of Columbia Municipal and Police Court buildings in Judiciary Square. The transition from the red brick Georgian Revival styled Central Building to the
abstracted classical elements of these buildings reflects the shift in public building styles which would culminate in the “Classical Moderne” or “PWA Moderne” structures of the late 1930s.

The United States Public Health Service and the Construction of the E Street Complex

The United States Public Health Service originated in 1798 as the Marine Hospital Service (MHS), a branch of the Treasury Department which cared for sick and injured seamen. In 1801, the MHS opened its first hospital in Norfolk, Virginia. In 1870, it became a national hospital system, directed by a medical officer who would later be designated “Surgeon-General of the United States.” In 1889, it was reorganized as a commissioned corps of medical personnel, which, by the turn of the twentieth century, included 144 physician-officers and operated a network of two dozen hospitals in major domestic ports, 121 seaman’s relief stations at remote sites, a tuberculosis hospital in New Mexico, and a leprosarium in Hawaii.

During the late nineteenth century, the densely-populated tenement districts of major cities were recognized as tinderboxes which could fuel deadly epidemics if communicable diseases entered from abroad. In 1878, the MHS began administering the quarantine program for persons entering the country, and research on the prevention, management, and treatment of infectious diseases soon became an increasingly important part of its mission. In 1887, it opened a small medical research laboratory at its Stapleton, Staten Island hospital. In 1891, the year that the MHS assumed responsibility for examining newly arrived immigrants, this laboratory moved to the upper floor of its headquarters at the Butler Building, a castle-like Victorian structure at the corner of First and C Streets SE in the District of Columbia.

Concerns about epidemic were even sharper in the twentieth century. In 1902, the MHS examined 857,000 transients annually at domestic ports and overseas locations including the territories of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines just acquired in the Spanish-American War. Nonetheless, that year the Surgeon-General reported 38 cases of bubonic plague “in the Chinese District of San Francisco,” and almost 43,000 cases of smallpox across the country, while expressing concern that yellow fever remained common in Mexican ports. The MHS research staff continued to investigate epidemic diseases including yellow fever, which had caused several staff fatalities, as well as certifying vaccine producers, and analyzing data about epidemics in other countries.

In 1902, Congress recognized the importance of these epidemiological functions by reorganizing the MHS as the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service (PHMHS). The previous year, it had appropriated funds to build a dedicated laboratory for the MHS’ Departments of Bacteriology and Pathology on five acres of Original Appropriation No. 4, which belonged to the Department

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of the Navy. This tract on the western slope of Navy Hill overlooked a riverfront industrial zone largely devoted to asphalt works and the castle-like Christian Heurich Brewery. On the on the opposite side of the hill, near the intersection of Twenty-third and C Streets, stood the malodorous Civil War era wooden building of the municipal dog pound. Although the Surgeon-General later reported doubts “as to the wisdom of building an institution in such an out-of-the-way and unhealthy locality,” Navy Hill was rapidly developing into a medical campus. While the new “Hygienic Laboratory” was being constructed, the Naval Medical School was relocating to the Old Observatory grounds the hill’s eastern slope.

By July, 1902, local contractor W.W. Speir had begun constructing the cruciform brick laboratory, designed by the Office of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury. On July 22, 1903, the PHMHS received the keys to the new building, which had cost $35,000 to construct and would require an additional $13,000 to equip. (Illustration C1 is a historic photograph of the laboratory in the later stages of construction.) During the laboratory’s construction, Congress had added zoology, pharmacology, and chemistry sections to its existing departments. Just months after the staff moved in during the fall of 1903, the Surgeon-General pronounced the new building overcrowded and requested an appropriation for an additional structure, to include a disinfecting shed, house, animal breeding house, and heating plant. He also complained about the new campus’ aesthetic shortcomings:

The grounds about the laboratory are in a very untidy condition, need grading and terracing, and should be arranged by a landscape gardener, so that the planting of trees and shrubbery may be done to attain an artistic end result. There is at present no separate entrance to our reservation, and the necessity for one need not be emphasized.

4 As Hayden Wetzel notes in the National Register Nomination for the 1912 Municipal Pound at South Capitol and I Streets SW, that the barking of the caged dogs awakened the Naval Hospital’s patients was probably among the least serious complaints of the old pound’s neighbors. He quotes a Washington Evening Star reporter’s 1904 account of a visit to the pound as a trek to a wilderness outpost:

   It stands – or perhaps it is better to say it leans – up against one of the murkiest hills in Foggy Bottom. It is only after a tour of houses full of holes, dogs, cats and oleaginous babies, and through a waste of dog fennel, wild strawberries... and pokeberries that you arrive at the most melancholy morgue... It is an enclosed structure of pine boards, like a stockade or stable.

(from Washington Evening Star, July 26, 1903, 5).
6 Annual Report of the Surgeon-General for 1904, 373
7 Ibid, 373
8 Ibid, 374
9 Ibid
Requests for additional appropriations became a litany in each annual Surgeon-General’s report to the President. Sometimes they reflected functional concerns, as when the Annual Report for 1906 noted that:

It is also urgently recommended that separate rooms be provided for certain work of a dangerous nature, or which requires delicate manipulation. For example: The tetanus work, diphtheria investigations, vaccine examinations, tubercle work, plague investigations, etc., should be carried on in separate rooms so as to avoid the possibility of accidents. There should also be a separate room for the delicate analytical balances, and certain details of chemical, pharmacological, and zoological work should be conducted apart… I have, therefore, to renew my recommendation for an appropriation sufficient to erect an additional building.  

However, requests also frequently suggested status anxiety and a desire to “keep up with the Joneses” on the other side of Navy Hill. In his 1905 report, the Surgeon General complained that:

The grounds present a sorry contrast to those of our neighbors, the Naval Museum of Hygiene and Naval Medical School. The two reservations combined constitute a public reservation of considerable extent and unusual prominence, situated as they are upon the summit of one of the most commanding hills in the District and in a section of the city which is rapidly developing. It would, therefore, seem to be a public duty to place our grounds in a sightly condition, corresponding to those of the naval reservation and in keeping with its position and dignity. During the past year a handsome statue of Benjamin Rush, one of the pioneer American physicians and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, in bronze and granite, was presented by the American Medical Association to the District of Columbia, and placed upon the grounds of the Naval Museum of Hygiene within a few hundred feet of our line. Magnificent terraced granite steps and approaches are now being built by the Navy Department as an entrance to their part of the reservation. These facts are given as a contrast to the rough appearance of our part of the reservation, which has not yet been cleared of weeds. The grounds should be terraced and artistically planted.

By 1908, at least a portion of these pleas had been heard by Congress, which appropriated $75,000 for an addition designed by the Supervising Architect which transformed the original Hygienic Laboratory into a 41 room building, 230 feet long, with two stories, an attic, and a basement. When completed, this addition, “of brown vitrified brick and . . . finished throughout with a view to absolute modern sanitation,” was so extensive that some observers considered it a completely new building. An accompanying 2,500 square foot masonry isolation building for

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12 Quoted by Hayden Wetzel, private email, based on material is taken from a “Mangy Curs and Stoned Horses: Animal Control in the District of Columbia from the Beginnings to About 1930,” a historical monograph by a city employee deposited with the DC Historic Preservation Office.
infectious disease research was surrounded by a brick and concrete wall and included six laboratory rooms, an animal keeper’s quarters, and a crematory where all refuse was burned.

Driven by the ever-expanding scope of medical knowledge as well as responsibilities that steadily increased as the Hygienic Laboratory won recognition for its research, even this active building program continually lagged behind needs. Before the expansion was completed in January 1909, the Surgeon-General reported that “the activities of the laboratory…. have grown so fast that they are believed to have already outgrown the addition.” He noted that another wing was needed in the rear of the Hygienic Laboratory for laboratory work, as well as classroom space for lectures and demonstrations staged for armed forces medical staffs.  

The facility remained unsatisfactory in additional ways. The laboratory bred its own research animals and the lack of heat and sanitation in their quarters depressed fertility and were blamed for several epidemics. In 1909, the Surgeon-General wrote:

There are three other buildings upon the reservation; one is a wooden structure used for the raising of guinea pigs; another a stable in which the horses, goats, rabbits, and other animals are kept; and finally, a shed for wagons and general storage, a room for conducting disinfecting experiments with gaseous substances, and a carpenter shop. These three structures were built some years ago of very cheap material and were intended for temporary use only. They are small wooden structures, and, because of their close proximity to other buildings, are a constant source of danger from fire. All three buildings are going to decay, and the roofs, which are of shingle, will soon be in need of extensive repair… The present frame structures should be demolished and their places taken by a new building constructed of brick and cement, so as to render it rat proof and capable of disinfection and proper heating.

He concluded on a familiar note:

When the present site of the Hygienic Laboratory was selected… the neighborhood … had long been regarded as an unhealthy part of the city. Since that time, however, conditions have changed, the malarious flats have been transformed into a beautiful reservation known as Potomac Park, and the improvements in the neighborhood have made it a notable situation in many respects… Grading and the construction of a retaining wall [are] necessary in order to put the grounds of the Hygienic Laboratory in such condition as to make them in keeping with the buildings and surrounding properties... Such improvements will put the reservation in keeping with the adjoining reservation of the Navy Department.  

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Pleas for a new animal house continued for the next four years, amplified by the Surgeon-General’s contention that its lack was delaying other projects:

The appropriation of $15,000, made for the construction of a retaining wall and grading of the laboratory grounds has not been used, due to the fact that upon mature consideration it was not deemed advisable to begin the grading until the frame buildings above alluded to had been removed... The result is the laboratory grounds are ungraded and incapable of being properly cared for, and present an unfavorable contrast to the neatly kept adjoining grounds of the Naval Medical School. Moreover, the laboratory grounds and the unsightly frame buildings are in full view of Riverside Park, and excite unfavorable comment from many.15

In 1912, Congress again reorganized USPHMHS, contracting its name to the United States Public Health Service (USPHS) and expanding its scope beyond communicable disease. Soon, its researchers were investigating industrial hygiene, water pollution, and narcotics addiction.16 A long-requested auxiliary building was finally completed in 1915, although lack of funding for metal cages required that the animals be held in wooden pens on the floor for its first year of operation. Its top floor was devoted to storage rooms and the second to quarters for animals and their provisions. The first floor held a carpenter shop, a shower, small rooms for the isolation of animals, and two rooms for testing disinfectants, as well as a small special laboratory. The basement stable held horse stalls, a blacksmith shop, boiler room, harness room, and wagon storage.17

The Surgeon-General also received the long-requested funds for grading and resurfacing the campuses front entrance, as well as a roadway connecting to the new animal house, with an exit on the southern end of the reservation, which “will obviate to a large extent the use of the present entrance through the grounds of the Naval Medical School.”18

During World War I, the USPHS saw the greatest expansion in its history, as it was placed under military control and made responsible for the hospital care of discharged war veterans. The focus of the laboratory shifted to manufacturing vaccines, evaluating industrial hygiene, maintaining sanitation at the numerous military camp sites around the United States, and combating the Influenza epidemic of 1918-1919.19 In the spring of 1919, construction began on a large new

17 The Animal House featured what was a high-tech waste disposal system at the time. It consisted of “a pit for animal refuse which leads a chute with branches to various floors, each opening being at the floor level, so that the refuse may be swept into the chute and deposited in the pit below. The pit is thoroughly screened and darkened to exclude the breeding of insects.
building for the development of biologic agents to fight disease. This two-story 27,500 square foot brick building was 208 feet long and 62 feet high, with two small hyphen-like wings protruding from each end. Situated just south of the Hygienic Laboratory, it was described as “fireproof to the floor of the attic.” The postwar expansion program was completed by a new wing added to the Animal House in 1920 and a tunnel between the original Hygienic Laboratory, renamed the “North Building”, and the new laboratory, then known as the “South Building” dug in 1922.

Through the mid-1920s, the Surgeon-General’s annual reports repeatedly recommended that the USPHS consolidate its administrative functions in a modern office building adjacent to the laboratories. However, its offices remained divided between the Butler Building on Capitol Hill and Buildings C and F, two of the World War I temporary buildings erected along B Street west of the Washington Monument. In 1926, the Coolidge Administration launched a major federal construction initiative which proposed that all USPHS functions be consolidated in a building on the E Street campus. This proposal gained impetus from plans to demolish the Butler Building to make way for the Longworth House Office Building, which were announced in 1927 but not finally accomplished until late 1929.

However, the continuing expansion of the federal public health program altered plans for the E Street campus. Late in 1926, Congress took up a bill to centralize federal medical research in a National Institute of Health (NIH) under the direction of the Surgeon-General. Despite backing from the scientific community and industry, three years passed before President Herbert Hoover signed a final law transforming the Hygienic Laboratory into the independent NIH. This May 1930 legislation included a $750,000 construction authorization, which was used to construct a new laboratory and office structure south of the 1922 USPHS laboratory, which then became known as the Central Building. A Doric-columned administrative headquarters known as the “Administration Building” was also erected, forming the east side of a central quadrangle bounded by the Central Building to the north, the new NIH “South Building” to the south, and an open side overlooking the Potomac to the west. The consolidated USPHS Headquarters building originally planned for the E Street campus was instead constructed several blocks away at 1951 B Street NW.

However, dedicating the E Street campus to the NIH proved another short-lived remedy, as expanding the role of the NIH became an immediate priority for the Roosevelt Administration.

26 “$750,000 U.S. Health Center Measure Signed,” Washington Post; May 27, 1930; 12.
After the Social Security Act of 1936 provided additional health research funding, the NIH announced the start of a “war on cancer.” The E Street campus could not accommodate the necessary facilities, and, when a cancer-stricken department store executive donated his 45 acre Bethesda estate to the government, the NIH used it to construct a combined teaching, research, and hospital campus which opened in 1938.

For a time after most NIH functions moved to Maryland, it was planned that the E Street campus would become the annex to a new naval medical school and hospital on the site of the Old Naval Observatory. However, the new hospital was instead built in Bethesda. During the years immediately preceding World War II, the NIH retained some laboratories in the South Building. The Central Building became an Army dispensary, while the Office of Emergency Management used the other campus buildings for temporary office space.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Years (1941-1945)

This second epoch in the E Street complex’s history began with obscurity. During the year before the United States entered the war, the E Street campus remained an isolated backwater as downtown Washington swarmed with defense workers and military personnel. Then, just months before Pearl Harbor, it became the headquarters of a new agency, the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI), which soon metamorphosed into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

The OSS was not simply a new agency; it was a new type of agency. Although its gestation had begun years before, the labor pains that preceded its birth began in 1940, as the “Phony War” in Europe progressed to widespread combat and an unlikely relationship blossom between a former Democratic governor of New York State and the Republican who had unsuccessfully fought to become his successor.

Hailing from a poor Irish-Catholic neighborhood in Buffalo, NY, William J. Donovan (1883-1959) first distinguished himself playing football for Columbia University. After graduating from Columbia’s Law School in 1908 with mediocre grades, Donovan practiced corporation law in Buffalo. In 1912, he and a group of friends gained authorization to found a New York State National Guard cavalry troop, which soon elected him its captain.

In 1916, Donovan traveled overseas on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation to request that food shipments for famine-ridden Poland be allowed to pass through the British blockade of Germany. He stayed on to tour Europe to assess relief needs, but was forced to return unexpectedly when his cavalry troop was called up to assist in the pursuit of Poncho Villa. Three days after he arrived home from six months of patrolling the Mexican border, Donovan was summoned to New York City and made a battalion commander in the famous 69th “Fighting Irish” Regiment.

27 “Navy Hospital To Get Health Unit Building,” Washington Post; Jun 27, 1936; 15
29 Ibid, 30.
Shipped out to France shortly after the United States entered the First World War, the 69th saw heavy combat in major offensives. By the armistice, Donovan was the most-decorated officer in the American army, earning the nickname “Wild Bill” in addition to the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal with two oak-leaf clusters, and two Purple Hearts, as well as the Congressional Medal of Honor. He returned to Buffalo as a colonel and celebrity.

During the early 1920s, Donovan became a national figure, only to fall from the spotlight by the decade’s end. In 1922, he launched a political career, campaigning for lieutenant governor of New York as a Republican. After losing that election, he was appointed United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, a position in which he created a chain of controversies through his energetic enforcement of Prohibition laws. In 1924, President Calvin Coolidge named Donovan a deputy assistant to Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, who had been his teacher at Columbia. Donovan soon became head of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division, and, after a string of courtroom victories, the subject of much speculation as a potential candidate for national office. Donovan fulfilled a duty to his party by energetically campaigning for the Republican ticket in 1928. However, President-elect Hoover then reneged on what Donovan considered to have been a promise of the Attorney-Generalship. Apparently believing that Hoover was surrendering to the same anti-Catholic forces that had helped him defeat Al Smith, Donovan clashed with him over possible consolation appointments and soon resigned from the Justice Department to found a successful Manhattan law firm.

While functioning as a sort of international legal troubleshooter, Donovan made another attempt at elective office while rendering informal service to the federal government. In 1932, he again failed in politics, running a losing race to succeed Franklin D. Roosevelt as governor of New York State. With future irony, one of his campaign speeches characterized Democratic presidential nominee Roosevelt as “a new kind of red, white and blue dictator” with “delusions of grandeur.” Both before and after this campaign, he travelled to Asian and European countries in search of business opportunities. His attitude toward the rise of fascism appears to have been equivocal, or perhaps expedient. In 1936, he visited Italy, met Mussolini, and was given a tour of the Ethiopian warfront. During his stay, he congratulated the dictator on Italy's “unity of spirit” and the Italian general Pietro Badoglio on his "great victory" over the brutalized Abyssinian tribesmen. On German fascism, Donovan was far sounder, protesting the Nazis' ill treatment of Jewish judges in 1933. After these trips, Donovan submitted written reports on his contacts to both the War Department and the British government.

After the outbreak of war in Europe, Donovan returned to public life by a circuitous route. In January 1940, the Warner Brothers’ movie “The Fighting 69th” starred James Cagney in the fictionalized role of a disgruntled private who makes good in the trenches, Pat O’Brien as soldier-turned-chaplain Father Duffy, and George Brent as Major Wild Bill Donovan. The film’s success put Donovan back in the public eye as a war hero. In June, with at least encouragement

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31 Ibid, 87.
32 Ibid, 115.
33 Ibid, 52
from the Roosevelt administration, Donovan accepted Sir William Stephenson’s invitation to
study British intelligence methods. On his return to the United States, Donovan spent several
days briefing President Roosevelt. According to some sources, he afterwards worked with his
law firm to craft the legal rationale for what became the Anglo-American Lend Lease
Agreement. With further encouragement from the administration, Donovan returned to England
in late 1940 to meet with Winston Churchill, and stayed to tour British positions on the
Mediterranean and Eastern European fronts until March 1941. On his return, he again briefed
American government officials and authored a lengthy memorandum outlining the requirements
for a centralized intelligence organization that assembled information obtained by clandestine
and other means.

Donovan’s mission sought to fill a void. As historian John Whiteclay Chambers II has written;

When World War II broke out in Europe in 1939, U.S. intelligence operations were
splintered among nearly a dozen federal agencies, often suspicious bureaucratic rivals
accustomed to competing for appropriations in tight peacetime budgets.

Key competitors for the president’s ear included the intelligence services of the Army and Navy,
the State Department, and the FBI, whose efforts largely centered on Central and South America.
No overarching organization synthesized data from these myriad sources into a coherent whole.
By the spring of 1941, the rapidity of developments in Europe had convinced the Roosevelt
Administration that the United States now required an agency to perform such a coordinating
function.

The first step in establishing an intelligence service was identifying a person with the skills to
assemble it. Donovan had established a personal bond with Roosevelt, and the information he
had garnered on his missions had won him influential supporters within high government
echelons. However, the president considered appointing numerous other candidates before
expressions of support from the British government and Frank Knox, the Republican Secretary
of the Navy in his “coalition cabinet,” tipped Roosevelt’s opinion in Donovan’s favor. On June
18, 1941, Roosevelt appointed Donovan head of a new Executive Office organization to be
called “The Office of the Coordinator of War Information” (COI) and financed by
“unvouchered” monies from the presidential Emergency Fund, whose expenditure required no
specific justification. The Federal Register reported that its functions would be:

36 John Whiteclay Chambers II. OSS Training in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War II.
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/oss/
37 Roosevelt gave great credence to Donovan’s claim that he had been treated unfairly by Hoover when he
wrote to Knox, “I should like to have him in the cabinet, not only for his own ability, but also to repair in
a sense the very great injustice done him by President Hoover in 1929.” See Michael Fullilove.
Rendezvous With Destiny. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2013), 73-74. Although both Roosevelt and
To collect and analyze all information and data which may bear upon the national security, [as well as] such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important to the national security not now available to the government [i.e. covert activities].

As historian Barry Katz has noted, Donovan believed that was it was more important to know the enemy’s capabilities than to learn his plans, and he once noted that “the major part of our intelligence was good, old-fashioned intellectual sweat,” rather than the fruit of clandestine activities. Developing the capability to aggregate and analyze such far-flung and complex data would have been a daunting task even without the pressure of unfolding events. As historian Barry Katz has noted;

With virtually no useable precedent …, Donovan had to raise virtually from scratch an army of analysts possessed of the expertise that would allow them to operate at the same level of professionalism as the services of Great Britain, Nazi Germany, and the U.S.S.R. He formed the core of this group by quickly recruiting his “College of Cardinals,” a group of prominent academics drawn largely from Ivy League universities, and directed for much of the war by Dr. William Langer of Harvard University. This core group in turn recruited more than 900 fellow researchers, representing fellow academics, scholars, and intellectuals, including seven future presidents of the American Historical Association, five future presidents of the American Economic Association, and two Nobel laureates, for what became the OSS’ Recruiting and Analysis (R&A) Branch. The historical influences of Donovan’s efforts were enormous. As Katz concludes;

Indeed, it is not to the war or to the CIA that we must look for the decisive impact of the Research and Analysis Branch but to that ultimate decentralized intelligence agency, the American academic establishment. Sovietology, the Area Studies movement, a particularly philosophical and historical current within the economics profession, and collaborative interdisciplinary research programs of every sort can be traced back to the wartime headquarters of the branch at 23rd and E Streets NW.

Donovan had attended Columbia University’s law school at the same time, as students they were acquaintances rather than friends.

38 Brown, 165
40 Ibid, 43.
41 Chambers, 27.
42 Katz, 45
43 Ibid, 49. The original text mistakenly gives the quadrant as “NE.”
Nevertheless, as Kermit Roosevelt’s official OSS history points out, the power of the centralized intelligence agency concept lay in exploiting potential interrelationships among analysis, espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and other unconventional warfare activities to enhance the effectiveness of each and transform “their combined effect… [into] one of the most potent weapons in modern warfare.”

Despite this early focus on research, this clandestine activities function soon became an increasingly important part of the COI’s portfolio. During the summer of 1941, Donovan began to assemble the nucleus of what would become the agency’s clandestine services by taking over a network of overseas agents formed by a State Department employee.

It had been assumed that the COI would maintain only a small staff, and initially Donovan was provided just two rooms in the Old Executive Office Building. However, such confining quarters could never have restricted his aspirations. As recruiting proceeded full-tilt, Donovan moved his new organization to a 6,500 foot space in the Apex Building (also known as the Federal Trade Building) of the Federal Triangle in August 1941. On August 20, 1941, the Public Buildings Administration advised Donovan that the COI also would be assigned the 8,800 square foot former NIH Administration Building, recently vacated by the Office of Emergency Management. On August 29th, Donovan responded by noting that the E Street complex’s only occupants were a “Health Service” activity in a portion of the South Building and an Army Dispensary on the first floor of the Central Building. He asked the Federal Works Administration for the other three former NIH buildings “in the best interest of economy, efficiency, and security.”

Donovan got his way, although not immediately. By the end of November 1941, in addition to the Administration Building, the COI occupied the recently-renovated North Building and a substantial part of the South Building, with the Central Building still utilized by the Army. By Pearl Harbor Day, Donovan had moved his office from the Apex Building to Room 109 in the Administration Building, which was thereafter nicknamed “The Kremlin.”

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44 Anthony Cave Brown, editor. The Secret War Report of the OSS. (New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1976), 42. The Secret War Report of the OSS is an edited version of the declassified version of the official War Report of the OSS, which was prepared in 1946 under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt. Hereafter, references to this book are attributed to Roosevelt if they are contained in a passage from the original text, or to Brown if they relate to an annotation.


48 Correspondence in the OSS files confirms that the Central Building first became available to the OSS during the second half of 1942, around the time that the OSS was being forced to relinquish Navy Buildings 13 and 14.

49 Fisher Howe, quoted in Charles Pinck, email of June 26, 2013. Substantial refurbishment of the second floor meant that the building was not fully occupied until early 1942. See COI-OSS DC Buildings and Areas Occupied – July 1941 to December 1944.”
C3 show General Donovan at his desk and at a ceremony in the quadrangle.) On December 21, 1941, the COI takeover was complete enough for Donovan’s administrative officer to request that the Public Buildings Administration change the formal name of the complex from the “National Institute of Health Buildings” to the “Coordinator of Information Buildings.”

For the duration of the war, the E Street campus housed the planning, command, and coordination functions of the international network that formed the COI and its descendent, the OSS. Tucked between the Navy Medical campus and Potomac Park, it seemed secluded from the bustle of downtown Washington. Some employees commented that the central quadrangle with its shrubbery added to the campus’ park-like atmosphere. Others recalled the complex helped instill an atmosphere of camaraderie, even though discussions about work projects were limited by the “need to know” model of secrecy. When air raid drills sent workers to their designated shelter in the nearby vaults of the Heurich Brewery, those who thought to bring a coffee mug enjoyed samples of the brewery’s signature Senate Beer and Old Heurich Ale.

Many COI staff members remembered sharing the campus with NIH laboratory animals during the agency’s early days. Just weeks before the COI took over the Administration Building, the Washington Post regaled readers with a series of articles about an NIH monkey who had fled the campus and led his keepers on a chase that ended with a dip in the Tidal Basin. Indeed, “a laboratory of monkeys infected with diseases … occupied the top floor” of the South Building throughout the COI’s first year. Donovan biographer Douglas Waller reports that the third floor of the Administration Building was still used for syphilis experiments involving guinea pigs, and that “for several weeks, Donovan’s aides gagged on the putrid smell from animals carried outside and incinerated nearby.” Shortly after new recruit Adelaide Hawkins reported for duty on December 3, 1941, she noticed a “no longer authorized occupant” running along a pipe above her desk in the basement of the Administration Building. Following procedures she had learned in orientation, she backed out of her office, firmly closed its door, and sought out one of the guards, “who had all received special training in rat-catching.” These wildlife tales apparently enjoyed such wide circulation that they were picked up by Berlin Radio, which on December 26, 1941 informed its listeners that the United States had formed an espionage and sabotage agency staffed by “fifty professors, twenty monkeys, ten goats, twelve guinea pigs, and a staff of Jewish scribblers.”

Even before the exponential expansion of the COI staff after Pearl Harbor, the former NIH buildings could not fully accommodate the agency’s needs. By the end of November 1941, the

52 Brown. The Last Hero, 174.
53 Waller, 74.
55 Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service Intercept, December 26, 1941, quoted in Brown, The Last Hero, 174.
Library of Congress was providing 7,200 square feet of space for the COI R&A staff, which drew heavily on its resources. Nor did Donovan stop at requisitioning government offices. During late 1941, agency staff investigated rental space throughout the city and considered taking over the newly-constructed Statler Hotel.  

By October, Donovan had had plans drawn for a dedicated COI building, to be erected south of the existing E Street campus structures. The new building, which would have housed 260 employees in approximately 33,000 square feet of offices, was to have a library wing, film storage, and theater areas, and provide roughly the area of the Central and North Buildings combined. A month before Pearl Harbor, the Washington Post reported that Donovan had sent his plans to President Roosevelt. However, presumably because of cost concerns as well as the outbreak of war, no construction ever took place.

After the United States declared war, the COI’s staff and space requirements continued to grow prodigiously. A week after Pearl Harbor, the COI had 596 employees, and, by March 1942, a staff of over 1,300. By June 1942, the COI had more than doubled its Washington holdings, almost entirely by requisitioning space off-campus. 14,000 square feet of the Department of Agriculture South Building had become the photographic operations area, while nearby Naval Hospital Buildings 13 and 14 and an office building at 1216 Twentieth Street NW provided smaller spaces whose area was roughly equivalent to that of the North Building. Clandestine operation offices became centralized in 46,000 square foot Temporary Federal Office Building Q, just east of the campus.

For the next three years, the E Street campus was rapidly adapted to the OSS’ ever-evolving role in the war. In June 1942, the COI fissioned, as its “white propaganda” operations that disseminated positive messages about U.S. war aims became part of the New York-based Office of War Information (OWI) directed by broadcaster Elmer Davis. Donovan retained control of the other COI functions, including analysis as well as clandestine and covert operations. His new organization was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and transferred from the Executive Office to the newly-formed Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This metamorphosis facilitated blending military and civilian personnel in OSS ranks, provided greater access to military resources and funding, and enabled Donovan to receive a military commission with eventual promotion to Major General.

This partition of the COI also reflected the increasing importance of clandestine and covert operations to the war effort. The COI management had struggled to create the capacity for

56 M.I. McHugh to Barnes, unpublished memorandum, January 17, 1942, with reference to Nelson P. Poynter- William J. Donovan letter of December 10, 1941. McHugh states that the Statler Corporation would likely object to leasing the hotel for office space.


58 “Roosevelt Given Plan for New Donovan Offices,” Washington Post, November 6, 1941; According to some reminiscences, Donovan moved his headquarters to the E Street campus as early as August 1941. This seems rather early, considering that the agency had been in existence for just two months. See Christof Mauch and Jeremiah Riemer. The Shadow War Against Hitler. (New York; Columbia University Press, 1999), 245.d

clandestine warfare because, “there was no precedent in America for such an undertaking” and a curriculum for “spies, saboteurs, and guerillas,” as well as their instructors and managers, had to be pieced together from orthodox military materials and techniques borrowed from British intelligence.\(^{60}\) Despite this lack of a model, these efforts were bearing fruit by the time of the COI’s transformation into the OSS. Counter-espionage activities blunted the threat of Axis invasions of Ireland, and neutral-but-fascist-leaning Spain and Portugal. The OSS provided key intelligence for Operation Torch, the invasion of French-held North Africa, planning for which began near the time it transitioned from the COI. By the time the invasion took place in November 1942, the OSS was moving full scale into overseas operations. In December 1942, it formally received responsibility for conducting “psychological warfare” on behalf of the Joint Chiefs.

Against this backdrop, the OSS staff continued to grow and the agency increased its space holdings by 50% during its first year. In July 1942, Donovan had complained to the PBA that two NIH experimenters, including a physician using ape subjects to study venereal disease on the third floor of the South Building, had not vacated the campus as promised.\(^{61}\) By June 1943, the OSS occupied the entire South Building. When the Navy demanded the return of Hospital Buildings 13 and 14 only a few months after making them available, some OSS operations relocated to the North Building, which had been vacated when the OWI staff moved out after fission of the COI.\(^{62}\) Formerly an Army dispensary, the Central Building also became available to the OSS during the fall of 1942.\(^{63}\)

The OSS also continued to acquire space located off-campus, if still in the neighborhood. Besides short-term “swing space” in Tempo M, the OSS staff occupied large areas in the Washington Auditorium Building at 1901 New York Avenue NW. The Coliseum Building at 506-510 Twenty-sixth Street NW, which had once been the Riverside Stadium skating rink, housed administrative and finance personnel.\(^{64}\) Foreign Nationalities Branch, which gathered information from foreign citizens and Americans with overseas ties, occupied offices in the Courts Building near Judiciary Square, while the Auth Warehouse at 623 D Street SW provided storage space far from the campus.

The space crisis became particularly acute as OSS overseas operations built to a peak during the final two years of the war. Beginning in 1943, the OSS played a major role in assisting indigenous irregular forces in China, Indo-China, and Burma in sabotage operations against Japanese forces. OSS agents undertook missions and supported resistance movements both before and after the invasion of the Italian mainland, which began in September of the same year.

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\(^{60}\) Roosevelt, 119


\(^{64}\) Chambers, 23-24.
During 1944, OSS teams aided resistance movements or conducted sabotage and espionage campaigns in Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Norway, while stations in Allied and neutral nations continued to coordinate teams of agents whose sources behind enemy lines provided critical intelligence. The Bern station, under the direction of future CIA director Allen Dulles, developed one of the most important intelligence contacts of the war, a disaffected highly-placed officer in the German Foreign Office who shared the contents of thousands of secret cables. In France, the “Jedburgh teams” of commandos carried on an expanded program of sabotage, espionage, and diversionary guerrilla attacks in preparation and follow-up to the D-Day Invasion on June 6, 1944.

As the war continued, covert and clandestine operations branches increasingly filled cavernous Temporary Building Q. Special Intelligence (SI) Branch was organized into regional geographic desks which managed the agents who managed networks of subagents in neutral or axis-occupied countries. SI personnel, largely civilians, were often involved in the night submarine drop-offs or parachute drops to contact local informants. The agents of Special Operations Branch (SO), most of whom were military personnel, were saboteurs and guerillas rather than spies. They worked in teams of two or three, including an officer and an expert enlisted radio technician/operator with Communications Branch training. Nicknamed “commandos,” their exploits were legendary. The Washington SO staff was small, totaling perhaps 45 members at its height in 1944, but it performed such vital servicing functions as highly-specialized recruiting, training, and supply, as well as overall planning.65

The Operational Group Branch (OG) sent teams of as large as 30 enlisted men and four officers to work with resistance groups behind enemy lines on a more long-term basis.66 Composed of Americans who spoke the local language, they planned and assisted with disruptive raids and sabotage operations at the enemy’s rear.

Counter-Intelligence Branch (X-2) protected the OSS itself from axis espionage. It was the conduit through which the OSS received some Ultra intercepts with counter-espionage utility from the British government. One of X-2’s most important functions was to maintain a Registry of information about individuals and organizations with foreign, enemy, or potential enemy connections. Another was feeding disinformation to enemy agents and attempting to convert some into double agents. X-2 also included an Art Looting Recovery Unit, which sought to thwart Nazi plans to finance a resistance movement with the proceeds from stolen art.67

Some clandestine operation functions could not be accommodated on an urban campus. OSS operations training took place at numerous facilities outside the District, including the Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, known as Area F, where overseas operatives were instructed in the use of firearms and demolition techniques, in addition to more mundane skills.68

The OSS built training camps in parks, including Catoctin Mountain and Prince William

65 Roosevelt, 100
66 Ibid, 111
67 Ibid, 92.
68 Ibid, 42.
By 1944, the OSS had expanded steadily to a staff of about 13,000, about three-quarters of whom were military personnel and about one-third of who supported overseas operations from Washington. The E Street campus staff continued to grow, displacing some activities to off-campus space. In 1943-44, most of the R&A staff moved from the South Building to a 46,000 square foot space in War Department Annex #1, the former Corcoran Courts apartment building at 401 Twenty-Third Street, as well as to the Library of Congress Annex, the Lincoln Museum, and Tempo A. Schools & Training Branch moved into the former Toner Public School at Twenty-fourth and F Streets NW. The second half of 1944 saw the four buildings inherited from NIH built out to maximum area, and office space added at 818-820 Thirteenth Street NW, along with much smaller areas at 1917 Eye Street NW and warehouses in Bethesda and Roslyn.

Although it inventoried only office space, a July 29, 1944 headquarters-wide survey provides the clearest snapshot of how the OSS utilized the E Street Campus near its staffing peak. However, these arrangements were not constant over time. Although its command and upper management tended to remain in place, many of the OSS’ fifty divisions, known as “branches,” migrated among its buildings. The agency operated in a state of constant flux, with the Headquarters population varying by hundreds of persons each month as staff departed for or returned from overseas.

At this point, staff members entered the campus through main gate in the 2400 block of E Street, and walked up the semi-circular drive in front of the North Building. The North Building sometimes referred to as “the Executive Staff Building,” housed administrative units, including the 94 employees of Procurement and Supply, the nineteen employees of Personnel Procurement, and the ten members of Medical Services. It also housed several functions unique to the OSS. Assisted by the General Counsel, the three-member Board of Review evaluated financial matters requiring a decision by Donovan, including the funding of new projects, operations, or bases. The 36 employees of Special Funds Branch administered “unvouchered expenditures” from the Emergency Fund, to which conventional accounting procedures did not apply. These office functions consumed only about 12,000 of the approximately 17,000 square feet of space

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69 Ibid, 61.
70 Ibid, 34.
71 Not to be confused with a World War I temporary building of the same name, the Corcoran Courts was built by the Morris Cafritz Company for Harry Wardman in 1926. In 1939, it was purchased for War Department use. After the war, it served as a State Department annex until its demolition with several neighboring temporary buildings in 1956. The current State Department Annex covers its site. See “Corcoran Courts Near Potomac Park,” Washington Post, Aug 2, 1925, R5, “Army Plans Strategic "Retreat" From State Department Building,” Baltimore Sun, Nov 29, 1938, 2, “Demolishing Of 3 State Tempos Set,” Washington Post, Aug 16, 1956, 25
72 Roosevelt, 70.

Section 8 page 23
listed for the North Building. The remainder was devoted to the building’s original non-office purpose – laboratory space.

The tunnel from the North Building provided egress to the Central Building, which was separated from the South Building by the central courtyard. The Central Building housed several high-level intelligence and psychological warfare staffs. These included the thirteen member staff of Deputy Director for Intelligence Brigadier General John Magruder, who oversaw the clandestine intelligence, counter-intelligence, and research and analysis functions of the agency from his personal office in Room 120. Among the other intelligence support activities in the building were the Current Intelligence and Censorship Divisions, which processed intercepts of cables, letters, and telephone summaries, and counterfeited identity documents. The Central Building also housed the Special Relations Office, which served as the OSS liaison with foreign missions and legations as well as other federal agencies. Special Relations also worked with the State Department to provide cover identities for the numerous undercover operatives serving on embassy staffs, and acted as a portal for the clandestine transmission of information between agents in the field and their managers in Washington through the diplomatic pouch system. The Central Building also included the Transportation Office, which arranged the transit of OSS personnel and supplies, often conducted under tight security. These responsibilities went far beyond the usual arrangements for a civilian traveler, often involving collaboration with military organizations to dispatch supplies to resistance groups or to route agents to assignments in combat theaters.

The 42 members of the Planning Staff and Planning Group on the second floor of the Central Building reported directly to General Donovan. The Planning Group was created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate strategic service and military operations and also oversaw the military program for psychological warfare. The group that sat in these organizations’ office row included noted Harvard anthropologist Gregory Bateson and University of California psychologist Dr. Robert C. Tryon, director of the OSS Psychological Division. It also included such later-day eminences as historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Common Cause founder and Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John W. Gardner.

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73 Telephone Directory – Office of Strategic Services, (February 1944), RG 226, Entry 194, Box 107, Folder 496, Wash-Dir OFF, Ad-80.
74 Roosevelt, 100
75 Ibid, 64
76 Ibid, 64
77 Ibid, 40-41.
78 Ibid, 65
80 Telephone Directory – Office of Strategic Services, (February 1944). See also “John W. Gardner” in the Gale Encyclopedia of Biography, accessed June 2, 2013 at http://www.answers.com/topic/john-w-gardner. The offices of other prominent post-war figures were scattered throughout the complex. For example, Herbert Marcuse of R&A Branch occupied Room 701 of War Department Annex #1. Eero Saarinen’s office in Visual Presentation Branch was on the first floor of the Auditorium Building.
For some time, the Central Building housed elements of the Morale and Operations (M&O) Branch, which eventually was consolidated in Q Building. Created in January 1943, M &O Branch advanced Donovan’s credo that “persuasion, penetration, and subversion are the modern equivalent of sapping and mining in the siege warfare of former days.” It created “black” propaganda leaflets and radio broadcasts to cause confusion, dissension, and disorder among enemy troops and civilians.

The entire lower floor of the Central Building was devoted to a laboratory for the Research and Design (R&D) Branch, which accommodated 51 employees. The R&D Branch “was specifically responsible for the development of special weapons and equipment necessary to subversive warfare.” It developed such devices as time delay fuses, pocket incendiary devices capable of starting as many as nine fires in succession, limpet mines attached to the hulls of ships with “the pinup girl,” a specially-hardened explosive driven nail, silent pistols for stealth attacks, edible explosives camouflaged as flour, and the “turtle egg” canister of abrasive materials for sabotaging gasoline engines. Its Documentation Division prepared false passports and identity cards, while its Camouflage Division created disguises for agents and equipment as well as to conceal explosive charges. Its Special Assistance Division formulated tablets to help agents resist interrogation, as well as suicide pills.

Throughout the war, the Administration Building was the command center of the OSS. William J. Donovan’s office was at the southeast corner of the first floor Building. Flanked by a large globe, General Donovan’s desk faced the front of the building, with a splendid view of the Potomac through large windows which he often kept open. Adjacent suites were occupied by his personal staff and assistants, among who was his law partner, Colonel Otto Doering. For a time, his staff included a young former publicist from California named Julia McWilliams, who, before transferring to Ceylon and marrying State Department official Paul Child, coordinated communications traffic that made her "privy to all messages both incoming from the field or Washington, etc., and outgoing to our agents and operatives all over China-Burma-India."

The largest unit in the Administration Building was the Message Center, which employed 140 members of the Communications Branch and included:

The Code Room, the Paraphrasing and Distribution Section, the Teletype Section and Typing Room…, a maintenance section… to maintain cryptographic and other mechanical devices…, and a Cryptographic Security Section which checked traffic for cryptographic insecurities [and] devised cipher systems.

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81 Roosevelt, 106
82 Roosevelt, 73.
83 Ibid, 73-77.
85 Roosevelt, 70.
As it expanded, the Message Center moved from the Administration Building’s second floor to larger quarters in its basement. The importance of its mission was evidenced by its proximity to Donovan’s office. Adelaide Hawkins recalled that once General Donovan, while personally delivering an urgent message for transmission, noted the operators’ humid working conditions, walked outside, and kicked out a windowpane to provide much-needed ventilation.86

The Administration Building also contained the offices of the Secretariat and General Counsel. The Office of the General Counsel performed conventional responsibilities legal functions but fulfilled some unique responsibilities. The OSS General Counsel oversaw the chartering of cover corporations for clandestine operations, the procedures for the disbursement of funds from secret moneys, and information regarding war crimes.87 The Secretariat oversaw the Reports Office and the Registry, which circulated documents and dispatches throughout the campus.88

The South Building, which was roughly the size of the North, Central, and Administration Buildings combined, housed several of the largest staffs on the campus. Besides the Naval Command, Security, and Courier Offices, its occupants included large contingents from the Communications and R&D Branches. The Communications Branch (nicknamed CB or “Commo”) maintained the secure cable and wireless network that linked agents, who were sometimes behind enemy lines, overseas stations, Headquarters, military facilities, and commercial lines. In addition to operating the Message Center in the Administration Building, the branch included an engineering section with its own research and development staff which developed solutions for communication problems unique to covert and clandestine operations. It included a laboratory on the third floor which provided specifications for and evaluated commercial components used to construct innovative “suitcase” radio receivers and transmitters for field use. Much description of these activities was deleted when the OSS Official History was declassified in the late 1970s. However, the publically-available text notes that the COM Branch developed the “Joan-Eleanor” system, which utilized the Very High Frequency band to link a clandestine operator with a portable radio on the ground to an airborne radio operator without requiring encrypted telegraphy. “Joan-Eleanor” was hailed as one of the “most successful wireless intelligence gathering operations, saving millions of lives by shortening the war” of the war by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.89 The R&D Branch developed such equipment as a submersible raft which could be deployed from a submarine, hidden under water, and raised periodically to allow the agent to utilize his COM Branch-designed waterproof radio equipment.90

The South Building also housed the OSS Theatre Group, which coordinated strategic service and military operations, and the 94 members of the R&A Branch Mapping Staff. Before the largest

86 Hawkins, 79-80.
87 Roosevelt. 44.
88 Ibid, 90-91.
89 Wolfgang Saxon. “Al Gross, Inventor of Gizmos with Potential, Dies at 82,” New York Times, January 2, 2001. Gross essentially invented citizen’s band radio and developed early versions of the walkie-talkie and later a pioneering pager. He developed his first walkie-talkie while a college student and secured an opportunity to demonstrate it to Donovan. As he recalled, “Donovan liked the idea. He recruited me and converted me from a civilian to a captain.”
90 Roosevelt, 75-76.
portion of the R&A Branch moved to War Department Annex #1 in mid-1943, over half the usable space in the South Building was occupied by R&A units which included the Board of Analysts, Special and Central Information, Pictorial Records, and Military Advisor sections.91

The Dissolution of the OSS

Although Donovan fought for its survival to the limit of his political strength, the end of the OSS came about even more rapidly than its formation. In October 1945, just two months after the Japanese surrender, President Harry S Truman disestablished the OSS after accepting Donovan’s forced resignation.

One theory attributes the OSS’ demise to the attritions of its ongoing turf battle with other intelligence agencies. Neither a purely civilian nor military organization, its bureaucratic rivalry with military intelligence and the FBI was so intense that Donovan joked that he had more enemies in Washington than Berlin. The OSS had been excluded from the Pacific Theatre at the insistence of General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, as well as from Central and South America because of the objections of J. Edgar Hoover. Because of concerns about the security vetting process for its hastily-assembled staff, both the American and British military commands had refused to share the decoded intercepts from Axis radio nicknamed “Ultra” and “Magic,” some of the most important clandestine intelligence of the war. Although Donovan had persuaded the British intelligence services to share some Ultra intercepts for counter-espionage purposes, this lack of access remained a major handicap to OSS analysts throughout the war.

Another theory is that the clash of styles and personalities between Donovan and the Truman Administration’s intelligence establishment proved fatal to the OSS. Donovan was a most unconventional federal official whose management style was described as “inspirational rather than organizational,” and he had unknowingly been nicknamed “Seabiscuit” by his office staff for his habit of dashing from task to task. He had frequently antagonized peers by going outside channels to mount direct appeals to his patron, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and had deliberately embarrassed them in meetings on occasion. One anecdote has Donovan publically presenting a military security official with a set of secret plans that his agents had stolen from a factory under that official’s jurisdiction.92 Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 left Donovan bureaucratically isolated, while a leak to a hostile reporter attributed to his bitter rival J. Edgar Hoover exposed his confidential proposal for a postwar intelligence agency to withering congressional criticism as a “plan for a domestic Gestapo.”

A third theory, advanced by historian Bradley Smith, is that the Truman Administration saw the processing of intelligence gained through crypto-analysis and electronic eavesdropping as more valuable than the traditional style of clandestine action championed by Donovan and practiced

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92 Ibid, 46.
by the OSS. In a sense, excluded from the benefits of ULTRA, the visionary planner of 1940 had fallen completely behind the times in just five years.

On September 28, 1945, General Donovan, who had only recently learned of Truman’s decision, made an emotional address to perhaps two thousand OSS employees assembled in the Coliseum Building, heralding their accomplishments and thanking them for their service. After his resignation was accepted, he returned to the practice of law and retired from public life, other briefly serving as ambassador to Thailand during the Eisenhower Administration.

Although President Truman signed Executive Order 9621 abolishing the OSS three days after Donovan’s farewell, his order temporarily retained a few OSS units in the State and War Departments. The State Department Interim Research and Intelligence Service (IRIS) incorporated the OSS R&A Branch and those activities of Visual Presentation Branch outside the American occupation zones in Europe. Uncertainty about the organization’s future and experimental decentralizations of its staff caused many former OSS analysts to depart before IRIS became a permanent State Department staff eighteen months later.

With the backing of the Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary John McCloy ordered General Magruder to retain the Secret Intelligence (SI) and the X-2 Counter-espionage Branches “as a going concern” in a War Department Strategic Services Unit (SSU) under his direction. The War Department also absorbed staff officers from the OSS Operational Groups and Morale Operations Branch. As SSU Director Colonel William Quinn recalled;

The orders that General Magruder received from the Secretary of War were very simple. He was charged with preserving the intelligence assets created and held by OSS during its existence and the disbandment of paramilitary units... My initial business was primarily liquidation. The main problem was the discharge of literally thousands of people. Consequently, the intelligence collection effort more or less came to a standstill.

During the early months of 1946, the temporary spaces were vacated, the OSS Headquarters was shut down, and most of its physical resources disposed of.

The Central Intelligence Agency Era

At the time the OSS was being disbanded, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were rising sharply. Even before the end of the war, a communist-dominated government had seized power in Rumania and the Allies had reluctantly recognized a communist-dominated government in Poland. In September 1945, one month after the Japanese surrender, communist-influenced nationalists proclaimed the formation of the Korean People's Republic. The early months of 1946 saw increasingly dramatic erosion in relations between the former allies. In

94 Ibid, 115.
95 Ibid, 115.
January, Albania set up the first explicitly communist regime in Eastern Europe. Soon afterwards, President Harry Truman declared that the United States would not recognize future communist governments, while Soviet leader Josef Stalin suggested that communism and capitalism were fundamentally incompatible. On February 22, 1946, Moscow Charge’d Affairs George Kennan sent his famous “Long Telegram” to Secretary of State James Byrnes, contending that Russian communism was “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus Vivendi,” and advocating that the United States adopt a policy of containment against communism’s seemingly relentless drive for expansion. In a speech at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously declared that an "Iron Curtain" had descended on Europe, while tensions increased as Soviet forces delayed a promised withdrawal from Iran.

It was against this backdrop, on January 22, 1946, President Truman signed the Presidential Directive establishing a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) headed by a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Structured to mitigate rivalry among civilian and military organizations, the CIG operated under the direction of a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) composed of the DCI, a Presidential representative, and the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy. Rather than an autonomous agency, the NIA defined the CIG as “a cooperative interdepartmental activity with active and equitable participation by its component departments and other federal agencies.”96 The CIG was to both collect strategic intelligence and conduct clandestine activities. Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, formerly Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence, became the first DCI, but was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg in June 1946. In May 1947, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter replaced Vandenberg in the post.

The CIG marked a historic extension of the central intelligence agency combination of analysis, espionage, and covert functions beyond wartime. From its early days, its organizational functions paralleled those of the OSS branches. Its administrative section functioned as a secretariat for the NIA and policed internal security, and a Central Reports Section to “carry out the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence” and prepare weekly briefing reports. A Central Planning Staff was charged with “coordinating intelligence activities,” while a Central Intelligence Services section conducted “other intelligence activities.”97 The CIG also took over functions that became the Foreign Intelligence Branch, which gathered information on other nations’ nuclear programs, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which monitored foreign broadcast and print media, and the Washington Document Center, which provided centralized translation services for documents in foreign languages.98 Vandenberg also entered into a “gentleman’s agreement” with the publisher of the New York Times, which allowed the CIG staff to monitor the newspaper’s internal correspondence, often without the knowledge of its author or recipient.

97 Rudgers, 111.
98 Ibid, 123-125.
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As CIA historian Michael Warner has suggested, the 1945 transfer of the SI and X-2 branches to the War Department’s SSU had been a means of preserving key OSS intelligence capabilities for future deployment.\(^99\) By October 1946, General Vandenberg had set up an Office of Special Operations (OSO), which absorbed the SSU’s functions. The OSO was charged with conducting “all organized federal espionage and counter-espionage operations outside the United States… for the collection of foreign intelligence information required for the national security.”\(^100\)

During the second year of the CIG’s existence, tensions with the Soviet Union continued to rise at an increasing rate. In January 1947, Communists seized power in Poland and soon won elections in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. On March 12, 1947, the president enunciated the Truman doctrine, which stated that the U.S. would aid the governments of Greece and Turkey, which were battling communist-backed political movements, and support any other country threatened by communism with economic and military aid. In June 1947, a month after Admiral Hillenkoetter replaced General Vandenberg as DCI, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the Marshall Plan of Economic Aid for Europe, which Stalin placed off-limits to Soviet-dominated nations. In July 1947, as tensions over the status of isolated Berlin grew, Congress passed the National Security Act, which created a civilian Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council and transformed the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an independent agency with its own budget. This CIA began operations on September 18, 1947.

Given its relatively brief existence, the secrecy of its mission, and the method in which it patched together existing intelligence organizations, it is difficult to identify the location of specific CIG offices. The original CIG Headquarters were located in the so-called New State Department Building, but moved to the New War Department Building at Twenty-First Street and Virginia Avenue NW during General Vandenberg’s tenure as DCI. Under Admiral Hillenkoetter, its headquarters shifted to the North Department of the Interior Building.\(^101\) However, it appears that, by September 1947, Admiral Hillenkoetter had joined at least a portion of the newly-formed CIA staff by moving his office to the Administration Building at 2430 E Streets.\(^102\) Until the present CIA campus opened in Langley, Virginia in 1961, CIA Headquarters remained on the E Street campus and its staff did not fully relocate until the complex passed to the Department of State in 1987. During this period, the agency’s use of the E Street campus buildings reflected its own changing structure, which was shaped by national security policy and geopolitical forces. (Illustration C4 and C5 show the North and Central Building’s during the CIA’s tenure.)

The early years of the CIA saw the development of a full-blown “Cold War,” a term Bernard Baruch coined in October 1948 to describe the chronic state of economic and political conflict


\(^100\) Ibid, 118-119.

\(^101\) Ludwell Lee Montague. *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence*. (State College: Penn State Press, 1992), 76.

\(^102\) Roscoe Hillenkoetter to the Secretary Of State, Secretary Of War, Secretary of the Navy, and Personal Representative of the President “Memorandum on NIA,” Unpublished CIA Memorandum, September 11, 1947. All unpublished CIA memoranda are online at http://www.cia.gov and are accessible by search.
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In that year, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, and the United States responded with the Berlin Airlift. In that same year, a communist-led coup ousted the government of Czechoslovakia, the last non-communist nation in Eastern Europe. Strikes by communist-dominated trade unions crippled the delivery of Marshall Plan supplies to Germany, France, and Italy. The CIA responded to these new forms of political warfare by forming Special Procedures Branch in February 1948 to conduct psychological operations affecting public opinion and the Office of Special Operations of Policy Coordination (OPC), the United States’ first peacetime covert action group. The OPC was credited with playing an important role in the defeat of communist candidates in the 1948 Italian elections.

The late 1940s and early 1950s also saw harsh criticism of the nation’s intelligence capabilities from the popular press and within the government itself. During the bleak year of 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb and communist forces triumphed in the Chinese Civil War. These twin shocks, coupled with domestic spy scandals which included the alleged theft of atomic technology, helped prompt invidious comparisons between American and Soviet intelligence capabilities. Following the recommendations from the report of a Commission chaired by OSS alumnus Allen Dulles, the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 reorganized the CIA and gave it great authority for covert action including psychological, economic, and paramilitary activities. This legislation authorized the Agency’s use of confidential fiscal and administrative procedures and exempted it from many of the usual limitations on the expenditure of federal funds.

After the largely-unanticipated invasion that began the Korean War in February 1950, General Walter Bedell Smith replaced Admiral Hillenkoetter as DCI. Widely considered a dynamic organizer and relentless innovator, Smith eventually merged the OPC and OSO organizations into what became known as the Office of Plans, instituted a strong training program, and was credited with professionalizing the CIA. In 1953, when the incoming Eisenhower Administration elevated Smith to Undersecretary of State, OSS veteran Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, became the first civilian DCI.

Stephen Ambrose writes that, “when Eisenhower became president, he encouraged the growth of the CIA, which under his direction and orders grew in size, expanding the scope of its activities and becoming one of America’s chief weapons in the Cold War.” Historian David Rudgers contends, that during the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA “metamorphosed into the shape of its OSS parent” as an organization that combined both analysis and covert action. John Ranelagh notes that clandestine operations and their support absorbed 54% of the agency’s budget from 1953 to 1961. In a sense, William J. Donovan lived to see the triumph of his

104 Rudgers, 172.
106 Ibid, 180.
107 Stephen E. Ambrose. Ike’s Spies. (New York: Doubleday; 1981), xii,
concept from the sidelines rather than the playing field. However, some analysts suggest that the predominant focus of the agency became clandestine operations during the 1950s and early 1960s. John Ranelagh notes that, in this era, American policy depended upon “forceful negotiation.” In tandem with the State Department, the “CIA played a crucial role as the other voice of U.S. foreign policy, and as the arm of hidden force with which the United States could take direct action without the overt use of its uniformed services.”\textsuperscript{110} The \textit{New York Times’} James Reston has gone so far as to write that the agency was transformed “from an intelligence gathering and analyzing instrument to an operating arm of the military services.”\textsuperscript{111}

These clandestine and covert operations dominate most accounts of the CIA written about this period. Famous examples include regime changes in Iran and Guatemala in 1954, the operation of Radio Free Europe, the U-2 reconnaissance plane program, and the espionage tunnel under East Berlin. They also include the proposed assassinations of foreign leaders and the Bay of Pigs invasion, whose failure led to the replacement of Allen Dulles as DCI in 1961. The CIA staff on the E Street campus managed these operations, provided technical support, and conducted research in new technologies, while performing the agency’s core function of collecting and analyzing information from all sources for the guidance of the President.

In a sense, the CIA’s tenure on E Street was like the OSS’. Driven by an endless chain of national crises, its personnel and functions rapidly expanded and quickly overflowed its command centers in the headquarters buildings. When Admiral Hillenkoetter succeeded General Vandenberg as DCI in May 1947, the CIG had a total staff of 1,800, about two-thirds of whom were stationed in Washington. Roughly one-half of these headquarters employees provided administrative support, one-third supported OSO activities overseas, and the remainder worked in analytic capacities.\textsuperscript{112} By 1952, the clandestine action OPC alone had 2,800 employees, as well as over 3,000 overseas contract workers. Its 1952 budget was twenty times larger than its 1949 allocation.\textsuperscript{113} The OSO doubled to 1,200 employees between January 1951 and January 1953, while the Office of Research and Reports increased from a staff of 461 in January 1951 to 766 in February 1953.\textsuperscript{114} As a predictable consequence, Assistant Director for Operations George Carey could describe South Building, whose occupants included the Office of Operations, as “bursting at the seams” in 1950, a year in which the agency operated on a “war footing” with a six day work week.

Charting the CIA’s specific uses for each E Street campus buildings is more difficult than determining the OSS’. One reason is that, like the OSS, the CIA distributed and redistributed activities among buildings in a constant struggle to fit new functions and increasing staff into available space, but did so over a longer period. An example is top-secret Project Aquatone, which developed the U-2 spy plane, which began in the former Administration Building, renamed the East Building in December 1954. However, its management team moved to the

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid, 340
\textsuperscript{111} Rudgers,
\textsuperscript{112} Rudgers, 128.
\textsuperscript{113} Ambrose, 176.
\textsuperscript{114} Ranelagh, 220.
third floor of the former Briggs School at 2210 E Street NW in mid-1955, to Tempo Building I on Ohio Drive three months later, and to the leased Matomic Building at 1717 H Street NW in early 1956.\textsuperscript{115}

A second reason is that, unlike the OSS, most detailed information about the internal organization and spatial arrangements of the CIA Headquarters is only slowly being declassified and made accessible to the public. However, the information that has been released clearly establishes that the East, Central, and South Buildings housed the command structure of the agency as well as vital functional units.

From Admiral Hillenkoetter through Allen Dulles, the DCI maintained his headquarters in General Donovan’s Office in the East (originally Administration) Building, with the birdhouse outside Dulles’ office window informally designated as Building 13½. As was the case with the OSS, the East Building also housed the Offices of the General Counsel, and the Director’s staff, as well as the Historical Staff.\textsuperscript{116} Throughout the 1950s, the Intelligence Advisory Committee, successor to the NIA, and other high-level panels met in the Director’s Conference room on the first floor of the East Building.\textsuperscript{117} After the opening of the Langley Headquarters in 1961, the East Building housed the Audio Operations functions of the Technical Services Division. The Director of Intelligence retained the use of Donovan’s office and conference room, both because it offered more convenient access to Capitol Hill and the White House and because;

A repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its daily meetings of the NSC Executive Committee, USIB, and the like would require a standby office in East Building be available at all times for the DCI and his secretaries.\textsuperscript{118}

The Central Building was particularly associated with the headquarters of the Office of Medical Services (OMS) from 1948 until the move to Langley. April 1962, a component of the Technical Services Division of the DDP moved from the North Building to join the rest of the TSD in the basement and first floor of the Central Building. In the 1960s and 1970s, TSD’s Disguise Operations were based in the Central Building.

South Building, the largest of the four permanent headquarters buildings housed a variety of operations, including much of Communications Division as well as the Secret Writing activities.


\textsuperscript{117} In the words of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1, issued January 19, 1950, the Intelligence Advisory Committee was composed of the “Director of Central Intelligence, who shall be Chairman thereof, the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the respective intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff (JCS), and the Atomic Energy.” Online at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nscid01.htm, accessed July 31, 2013.

\textsuperscript{118} “Memorandum for Deputy Director for Support,” Unpublished CIA memorandum, November 11, 1965.
E Street Complex (OSS and CIA HQ)  Washington, DC

Name of Property  County and State

In 1947, it accommodated the Office of Collection and Dissemination Division. A 1953 memorandum reveals that the Deputy Director of the Office of National Estimates occupied Room 114 of the South Building. The Office of Operations was also housed in the South Building. Allen Dulles retained office space on the building’s second floor after his tenure as DCI ended in 1961.

Like the OSS, the CIA expanded into the tempo buildings on the Mall, as well as leased spaces around the city. Its original holdings included Tempo Buildings M and Q, and, in 1951, it took over Tempo Buildings I through L on the Reflecting Pool. By the mid-1950s, the Division of Plans occupied Buildings J, K, and I, which came to be nicknamed “the spook quarters.” The Photo Interpretation Division was situated in Building Q until it moved to space in the Steuart Motor Company Building at 1014 Fifth Street NW in 1956. In March-April 1963, agency personnel still occupied space in six additional permanent buildings, which included the Rosslyn Garage, the overt personnel office at 1016 Sixteenth Street NW, and the Matomic Building.

**Leaving the E Street Campus**

OSS veteran and future CIA Director Richard Helms, who served in the OSS and joined the CIG in 1946, captured some of the flavor of the E Street campus in his memoir, *A Look Over My Shoulder*:

> The former OSS premises – four masonry and two temporary wooden structures- that CIG and SSU had taken over were atop a slight knoll in the Foggy Bottom area. Our neighbors were a local brewery, a faded roller rink, an abandoned gasworks, and, just beyond walking distance, the new State Department premises. My office was in Q Building, one of the wooden structures built early during World War II. When the building had to be given up, we moved to a string of temporary buildings ranged along the reflecting pool in front of the Lincoln Memorial. In some ways, these shabby,

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120 L.K. White to Executive Assistant to the Director, “Office Space and Secretarial Assistance,” Unpublished CIA memorandum, October 23, 1953.
121 L.K. White to Director, “Space Allocation in the Central, East, and South Buildings,” Unpublished CIA memorandum, April 26, 1962. Confusingly, the South Building was referred to as the “Administration Building,” the original name of the East Building, during the final years the CIA was headquartered at the E Street complex.
123 The “spook quarters” nickname is referenced in Anonymous. *Planning and Construction of the Agency Headquarters Building, January 1946 - July 1963 (Volume I: Text)*. (Langley: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Staff, June 1973), Figure 8 caption. Information on tempo building locations is from Ambrose, 265.
essentially inconspicuous, but centrally located buildings seemed appropriate for a secret intelligence organization… The construction work was rough and manifestly not meant for the ages. The buildings were cold in winter, wet in rain, soggy and stifling in summer. The heat absorbed by the tin roof of my second floor office taught me the difference between perspiration and sweat. When the temperature and humidity reached a certain point – we called it “fission”- civil service regulations required us to send the staff home. Though we worked in shirt sleeves, carbon copies seemed to melt in our hands. Without air conditioning, the soggy summer in Foggy Bottom meant that like the Dead Sea scrolls, some files had to be peeled apart.  

Not surprisingly, the first request for a consolidated intelligence headquarters preceded the formation of the CIA. In 1947 CIG Director General Hoyt C. Vandenberg proposed moving the agency from the ten separate buildings it occupied to a modern structure capable of accommodating all employees beneath one roof. General Vandenberg complained particularly about the security risks posed by the tempo buildings:

Two of the buildings ("M" and "Q") are of temporary construction housing the most secret phases of the centralized day-to-day operations of the Group. Access to these buildings by simple housebreaking methods are inherent in their construction both buildings constitute an ever-present' fire hazard. Loss of the documents and/or information would be a severe blow to national security.  

Allen Dulles, first civilian CIA Director, had a more visceral reaction to the tempo buildings. Aides recall that, stepping into one of the clandestine services buildings one Sunday morning, “he forgot his errand and snorted, ‘This is a damned pig sty’."

For nearly a decade, each new DCI reiterated these requests, but construction and design activities remained stalled for lack of funding. In 1948, the newly-formed CIA received permission to begin site discussions with the Public Buildings Service and in 1951 Congress authorized an expenditure of $38,000, 000 for a Headquarters building, but no funds were actually appropriated. As a stop-gap, the agency considered adding wings to Tempo Buildings Q and M, only to be told by the General Services Administration that this would represent a misappropriation of public parkland. The CIA also tried unsuccessfully to acquire the Navy and Munitions Buildings, huge World War I era temporary structures on the mall in the neighborhood of the E Street campus.

The mix of urban and suburban locations considered for a consolidated CIA Headquarters reflected intelligence considerations, civil defense policy, and logistical realities. Although

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127 *Planning and Construction*, 2.
129 *Planning and Construction*, 6-7 and 31-32.
130 Ibid, 11.
suburbanization was already a dramatic socioeconomic trend in the early 1950s, the search for federal office sites outside the city was given impetus by the dispersion standards for federal offices promulgated by the Office of Defense Management (ODM). Among the suburban locations considered for the CIA were sites in Arlington, Alexandria, and Fairfax, “the Casey Tract” near Bethesda Naval Hospital, and the Suitland Federal Center site in Maryland.

Although the Soldiers Home Campus in Northwest Washington and the Southwest Redevelopment area became urban candidates, in 1952 agency staff also began considering either the existing campus or a plot immediately across E Street. Allen Dulles, who became DCI in 1953, was originally a proponent of expanding the E Street campus. He argued that agency headquarters should hide in plain sight, in “a building with so many services and visitors that identification of a secret staff and their visitors would be rendered difficult.” Dulles was partial to maintaining a location close to the State and Defense Departments, as well as the White House, which were just a ten minute drive from E Street. In 1954, he requested a dispensation from the ODM dispersion requirements intended to limit vulnerability to nuclear strikes on the Pentagon, Capitol, or White House. However, Dulles was ultimately overruled and the plan to expand the E Street campus was abandoned. Deputy Director Lawrence “Red” White recalled that:

{Dulles] and I talked a little bit, and we were considering tearing down the old Heurich Brewery, and it was right where the Kennedy Center is now. We were thinking of taking that over and building the building right here.

However, when they presented this plan to President Eisenhower on May 7, 1955, White recalled that the President became angry and stated that “This town is so cluttered up now you can’t get from one end to the other, and you are going to get out of town.”

Although Dulles also told Congress that the CIA wished to avoid downtown traffic congestion, civil defense considerations apparently loomed large in the ultimate selection of a site. In Colonel White’s minutes of a subsequent meeting, White House Staff Secretary and key Eisenhower aide Colonel Andrew Goodpaster quoted the president as having said on May 7th that, while the CIA should not necessarily have to comply with the dispersion standards, “he wanted us to get as on the outskirts of the City, as far out as we thought we could without hampering our activities.”

In early June, a few weeks after the meeting with Eisenhower, Dulles, in a startling reversal of his previous positions, advised Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams that the Suitland was an

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131 Grose, 417
132 Planning and Construction, 39.
134 Ibid, 1.
135 Planning and Construction, 67-70.
At a special June 14th meeting at the White House attended by White, Dulles, Adams, and Goodpaster, among other executives, ODM Director Arthur Flemming agreed, after consultation with the cabinet, that the CIA should receive an exception to the dispersion rules and, after discussion about survivability in an attack which was redacted from the declassified minutes, Adams advised the group that Eisenhower would accept either the Alexandria or the Fairfax site.137

Eisenhower ultimately approved the Fairfax site, a tract of largely federally-owned land in Langley, Virginia. This Fairfax County location, suitably remote at seven miles from the Ellipse, was formally selected after the GSA determined that its security, expansion potential, and transportation access were superior to those of Dulles’ original favored site in Alexandria, and that the construction budget could finance an eight mile extension of the George Washington Parkway to provide commuter access, as well as what officials of the Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce told Congress was an urgently-needed escape route in the event of an attack on Washington.138 After the agency spent several years acquiring land for roads and preparing the site, Eisenhower presided at the laying of the cornerstone of the CIA Headquarters Building on November 3, 1959.

The suburban relocation of CIA Headquarters dovetailed with the urban renewal program of the 1950s. By the early 1950s, the impetus to rebuild downtown Washington had reached critical mass, with the redevelopment of Southwest Washington as its pilot large-scale project.139 In 1956, much of Foggy Bottom was included in a second round of urban renewal plans to facilitate the expansion of the George Washington University campus and the construction of an “Inner Loop Freeway” along the north shore of the Potomac. A parallel ten year plan to provide modern office space for federal agencies targeted all thirty-four tempo buildings on the mall and around the Lincoln Memorial, which had long been assailed as eyesores.140

When the first employees moved into CIA Headquarters on September 20, 1961, the stage was set for the freeway stage of the urban renewal project. By early 1962, Buildings Q and M were

137 Planning and Construction, 67-70.
138 Planning and Construction, 71-72.
139 Ironically, Allen Dulles, who had been deeply involved in the planning process, was not among them. After the abortive CIA-planned Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961, President John F, Kennedy had replaced Dulles as DCI with John J. McCone.
140 Wes Barthelmes, “34 Tempos Doomed in Plans for Buildings,” Washington Post; Jul 18, 1956; 1
Demolition of the North Building to make way for the E Street Freeway, a project which also claimed the venerable Heurich Brewery, started in May 1963. (Illustrations C6, C77 and C8 are aerial; views of the campus before and after highway construction)

Yet, despite the goal of locating all CIA personnel under one roof, the agency was not able to withdraw fully from the E Street campus. Many of the technical service workshops and research facilities remained on the E Street campus until the complex finally shifted to State Department control in 1987. Since that time, the State Department has utilized the E Street campus to house a variety of high security operations.

8. Statement of Significance

Applicable National Register Criteria
(Mark “x” in one or more boxes for the criteria qualifying the property for National Register listing.)

- Property is associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.
- Property is associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.
- Property embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction or represents the work of a master, or possesses high artistic values, or represents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components lack individual distinction.
- Property has yielded, or is likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history.

Criteria Considerations
(Mark “x” in all the boxes that apply.)

- Owned by a religious institution or used for religious purposes
- Removed from its original location
- A birthplace or grave
- A cemetery

The E Street Complex, composed of the East, Central, and South Buildings, the now-demolished North Building, and its central quadrangle, played an essential role in the formation and growth of four highly-significant federal agencies; the United States Public Health Service (USPHS), the National Institute of Health (NIH), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Complex is currently listed as an individual landmark on the DC
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Inventory of Historic Sites and has been deemed National Register-eligible by the DC Historic Preservation Office for its association with the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service Hygienic Laboratory (National Institute of Health). This designation does not extend to its later service as the headquarters of the OSS and CIA.

The E Street Complex is significant under District of Columbia Criteria A, B, C, D, and G, as well as National Register Criteria A through D. Its full period of significance begins with the completion of the Marine Hospital Service’s Hygienic Laboratory in 1903 and continues through 1961, when the Central Intelligence Agency moved its headquarters from the complex to a reservation in Langley, Virginia. The previously-recognized period of significance presumably ends in 1938, when the National Institute of Health relocated to its new campus in Bethesda, Maryland.

The National Parks Service states that, to achieve historical significance, a site or building must “possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association.” The buildings and quadrangle of the E Street complex are substantially unaltered from photographs which date back to their period of significance and convey these clear associations with the historic events which took place within them.

Narrative Statement of Significance (Provide at least one paragraph for each area of significance.)

STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

The E Street Complex, composed of the East, Central, South Buildings, the now-demolished North Building, and its associated quadrangle, played an essential role in the formation and growth of four highly-significant federal agencies; the United States Public Health Service (USPHS), the National Institute of Health (NIH), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Viewed more broadly, each era in the complex’s history represents an element in the definition and development of the functions of the federal government. These include the creation of a federal role in public health, the development of federally-conducted medical research, and the evolution of central intelligence as a vital component of national security. The complex is also associated with important events in twentieth century American history, especially during World War II, as well as the Korean and Cold Wars. The E Street Complex is significant to the evolution of the centralized intelligence agency function to a permanent element of national security, considered essential function in peacetime as well as war by national leaders beginning with the Truman Administration.

Thus, the E Street Complex meets District of Columbia Criteria A, as “the site of events that contributed significantly to the heritage, culture or development of the District of Columbia or the nation,” and B, as it is “associated with historical periods … groups, institutions, [or] achievements… that contributed significantly to the… development of the District of Columbia

or the nation.” For the same reasons, it also meets the similar National Register of Historic Places Criterion A.

Although the Complex is associated with the careers of numerous prominent individuals, perhaps its most significant associations are with General William J. Donovan, Director of the OSS and the founding father of the modern intelligence agency in America, and Allen W. Dulles, the first civilian and longest-serving Director of Central Intelligence. It therefore meets DC Criterion C, as it is “associated with the lives of persons significant to the history of … the nation,” and the similar National Register Criterion B.

The E Street Complex buildings exemplify the architectural transition from the Beaux Arts-influenced neoclassicism of early twentieth century federal buildings to the stripped classicism associated with those of the New Deal era. The Complex’s plan of individual structures surrounding a landscaped central court is likewise reflective of public building campus designs of its era. The Complex thus meets DC Criterion D, as it reflects “the distinguishing characteristics of architectural styles [and] building types … or … expressions of landscape architecture… or urban planning, siting, or design significant to the appearance and development of the District of Columbia or the nation.” It also meets similar National Register Criterion C.

Like the Naval Hospital campus on the opposite side of Navy Hill, the E Street Complex’s campus is likely to yield archeological resources which contribute to the understanding of the history of medical research. It therefore meets District of Columbia significance Criterion G, as well as similar National Register Criterion D.

A question for analysis is whether the absence of demolished structures diminishes the integrity of the Complex. This question must be answered in turn for each stage in the development of the complex covered by the period of significance.

During its service as the Hygienic Laboratory and NIH Headquarters, the Complex contained utilitarian auxiliary buildings, ranging from crude wooden sheds mentioned in the Surgeon-General’s Annual Report for 1907 to the Animal House constructed in 1915, which no longer stand. While these buildings undoubtedly would have presented information about the history of medical research technology and its architecture, their absence does not diminish the significance of the buildings that still stand, which were the locations in which scientific research actually took place and public health policy was formulated. Their sites also may well contain significant archeological information to illuminate their functions.

The principal loss has been the North Building, demolished for highway construction in 1963. Although the North Building housed administrative functions during the OSS and CIA eras, its area of greatest significance was that it incorporated the original Hygienic Laboratory of 1904 and was the initial building in the Complex. However, the three surviving buildings in themselves possess significant association with the development of federally-sponsored medical research and public health administration. The sufficiency of this association was recognized when the Complex was entered on the DC Register of Historic Sites even in the absence of the North Building.
Histories of the OSS and CIA often have centered on the heroic overseas exploits of clandestine operatives or the larger-than-life personalities of figures like OSS director General William J. Donovan. However, behind the dramatic successes of the spies and saboteurs in the field were the essential management, planning and technical functions which took place in the buildings of the E Street campus.

The surviving E Street Complex buildings possess particular significance because they housed the coordination and control functions of both the OSS and the CIA. As Kermit Roosevelt’s official history of the OSS points out, the power of the centralized intelligence agency concept lay in creating interrelationships among analysis, espionage, sabotage, propaganda, and other unconventional warfare activities to enhance the effectiveness of each and transform “their combined effect… [into] one of the most potent weapons in modern warfare.”

Although each of these functions had been utilized at various times in previous wars, their coordination and management within a single agency was pioneered by the OSS and refined by the CIA. This coordination and control, which took place in the surviving headquarters campus buildings, constitutes the most significant contribution of the OSS and CIA to the concept of a centralized intelligence organization.

Even without the secrecy that still shrouds some elements of even long-ago operations, it would be difficult to restrict particular OSS and CIA functions to a single building or isolate the major activities which made a particular building significant in ways that the others were not. Both agencies’ divisions and branches tended to move between buildings as they expanded in size or agency requirements changed. The major exception is the East (originally Administration) Building, as it was the location of the offices of OSS Director William J. Donovan and CIA Director Allen W. Dulles and their executive staffs. The significance of the East Building extends to the Director’s Office Suite, occupied by Donovan and Dulles, as well as the Director’s Conference Room, which was the site of many meetings related to national security issues of the most critical nature.

However, at least some specific associations can be identified for every building. For example, although at its peak the OSS R&A Branch, one of the agency’s most innovative contributions to the evolving concept of a central intelligence organization, a number of buildings both on and off-campus, it was based in the South Building before it outgrew those quarters. The Central Building was associated with the development of modern concepts of psychological warfare and propaganda, as well as the high technology spy craft pioneered by the OSS R&D Branch and the CIA.

Anthony Cave Brown, editor. The Secret War Report of the OSS. (New York; Berkley Medallion Books, 1976), 42. The Secret War Report of the OSS is an edited version of the declassified version of the official War Report of the OSS, which was prepared in 1946 under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt. Hereafter, references to this book are attributed to Roosevelt if they are contained in a passage from the original text, or to Brown if they relate to an annotation.

Section 8 page 42
Some important OSS and CIA functions took place in such off-campus buildings as the tempo buildings of “Spook Village” on the mall, War Department Annex #1 on Twenty-third Street NW, or the Steuart Motor Company Building at Fifth Street and New York Avenue NW, all of which are now demolished. These associations might have led to a finding of significance for these buildings as individual landmarks. However, most of these activities originated in the surviving Complex buildings, which also possess significant associations with them.

**Period of Significance**

Although no period of significance is provided, presumably the period under the original designation would end in 1938, when the NIH moved to its Bethesda campus. However, the campus’ significant transcends it occupancy by the NIH and extends through its service as the Headquarters of the OSS and CIG-CIA. This period begins in 1941, when the newly-formed OSS began transferring its functions to the campus and ends in late 1961, when the CIA officially transferred its headquarters to Langley, Virginia. This 1961 date is shortly after the retirement of Allen W. Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence.
9. Major Bibliographical References

**Bibliography** (Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form.)


Montague, Ludwell Lee. *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence*. (State College: Penn State Press, 1992)


*Telephone Directory – Office of Strategic Services,* (February 1944)


______________________________________________________________

**Previous documentation on file (NPS):**

___ preliminary determination of individual listing (36 CFR 67) has been requested
___ previously listed in the National Register
___ previously determined eligible by the National Register
___ designated a National Historic Landmark
___ recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey  #__________
___ recorded by Historic American Engineering Record # _________
___ recorded by Historic American Landscape Survey # __________

**Primary location of additional data:**

___ State Historic Preservation Office
___ Other State agency
___ Federal agency
___ Local government
___ University

Sections 9-end  page 45
E Street Complex (OSS and CIA HQ)  Washington, DC

Name of Property

 County and State

___ Other

Name of repository: ____________________________________________

Historic Resources Survey Number (if assigned): ____________

10. Geographical Data

Acreage of Property ____________

Use either the UTM system or latitude/longitude coordinates

**Latitude/Longitude Coordinates**
Datum if other than WGS84: _________
(enter coordinates to 6 decimal places)
Latitude: 38.895342°  Longitude: -77.050103°

1. Latitude: Longitude:

2. Latitude: Longitude:

3. Latitude: Longitude:

**Or**

**UTM References**
Datum (indicated on USGS map):

[ ] NAD 1927  or  [ ] NAD 1983

1. Zone:  Easting:  Northing:

2. Zone:  Easting:  Northing:
Verbal Boundary Description (Describe the boundaries of the property.)

The E Street Campus is located on a federal reservation on Navy Hill in Northwest Washington, DC. Its boundaries are the east side of the 2300 and 2400 blocks of E Street NW to the north, the fenced and unfenced boundary with the United States Naval Medical Complex to the east, and the highway right of way to the south and west.

Boundary Justification (Explain why the boundaries were selected.)

These boundaries represent the area associated with the historic resources of the complex as described in the statement of significance.

11. Form Prepared By

name/title: Douglas Sefton with Ron Freesne and Michael Tallent
Organization: DC Preservation League
street & number: 1221 Connecticut Avenue NW Suite 5A
city or town: Washington state: DC zip code: 20036
e-mail_Info@dcpreservation.org
telephone: 202-644-7183
date: November 10, 2013

Photographs
Submit clear and descriptive photographs. The size of each image must be 1600x1200 pixels (minimum), 3000x2000 preferred, at 300 ppi (pixels per inch) or larger. Key all photographs to the sketch map. Each photograph must be numbered and that number must correspond to the photograph number on the photo log. For simplicity, the name of the photographer, photo date, etc. may be listed once on the photograph log and doesn’t need to be labeled on every photograph.

Photo Log: See Attachment 2